Non-Economic Supreme Court Sports Cases
So far, this blog has focused a lot on the courts and antitrust laws. However, some of the most interesting cases on sports have nothing to do with economics. We’ll consider some of these here.
This post is a little different from most. I’ll provide a brief introduction of the constitutional questions involved, then ask you to read case summaries from the website Oyez that include a) the facts, b) the question, and c) the conclusion of the case.
first amendment cases
The First Amendment of the Constitution reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Let’s take the first three liberties in order.
The Establishment Clause
The First Amendment begins by prohibiting Congress from establishing an official religion. It seems straightforward enough, but the Establishment Clause has a lot of grey areas. Can a prayer be said before a legislative session or at the start of a school day? Can a city erect a nativity scene on government property?
Can a prayer be said before a high school football game?
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000)
Facts of the case
Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The District Court enjoined (i.e., prohibited) the public Santa Fe Independent School District (henceforth: the District) from implementing its policy as it stood.
While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, non-proselytizing prayer.
[Commentary. What the District tried to do with the election policy was turn this into a free speech or free exercise case. Essentially, they said, “Hey, it’s the students’ choice whether to say a prayer and who should then say it. We have nothing to do with it, so it isn’t an Establishment Clause case.”]
The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari [i.e., asking the Supreme Court to consider the case], claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.
Question
Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority.
In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."
Source: "Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-62. Accessed 9 May. 2024.
The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause says the government cannot tell you how to practice your faith. But does that mean Amish families can keep their children from attending school? Can a city outlaw religious animal sacrifices? Can practitioners use illegal drugs as part of a faith ritual?
Can a football coach say a prayer at the 50-yard line?
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022)
Facts of the case
Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him.
Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Question
Is a public school employee’s prayer during school sports activities protected speech, and if so, can the public school employer prohibit it to avoid violating the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion
Yes and No. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.
The District disciplined Coach Kennedy after three games in October 2015, in which he “pray[ed] quietly without his students.” In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. As to his free speech claim, the timing and circumstances of Kennedy’s prayers—during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities—confirm that Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. The District cannot show that its prohibition of Kennedy’s prayer serves a compelling purpose and is narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose.
Source: "Kennedy v. Bremerton School District." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/2021/21-418. Accessed 9 May. 2024.
Free Speech
We’ve all bad-mouthed a coach behind their back. What if you get caught?
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. (2021)
Facts of the case
B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption, “F*** school fuck softball f*** cheer f*** everything.”
The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year.
B.L. sued the school, alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment, (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory, and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague.
The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the First Amendment prohibit public school officials from regulating off-campus student speech?
Conclusion
Yes. In an 8-1 decision for B.L., the Court held that the First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials. In this case, the school district’s decision to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting to social media vulgar language and gestures critical of the school violates the First Amendment.
The Court found that B.L. spoke in circumstances where her parents, not the school, had responsibility, and her speech did not cause “substantial disruption” or threaten harm to the rights of others.
Source: "Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-255. Accessed 9 May. 2024.
The 4th Amendment
The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Does that mean that I have to submit to a marijuana test just to play football?
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995)
Facts of the case
An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.
Question
Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?
Conclusion
No. In an 6-3 decision for Vernonia School District, the Court held that the reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.
Source: "Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-590. Accessed 9 May. 2024.
The Supreme Court and Statutory Law
Federal Courts not only consider constitutional questions, they also rule on statutory law (i.e., laws passed by Congress and signed by the president). One such law is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990. The act prohibits discrimination against and requires reasonable modifications for people with disabilities.
Does that mean a professional golfer can take a cart?
PGA TOUR, Inc. v. Martin (2001)
Facts of the case
Casey Martin has a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Martin made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament, the PGA refused.
Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating "public accommodations" to make "reasonable modifications" in its policies "when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations."
Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.
Questions
Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provide access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability?
May a disabled contestant be denied the use of a golf cart because it would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all other contestants must walk?
Conclusion
Yes and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits the PGA from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability and that allowing Martin to use a cart, despite the walking rule, is not a modification that would "fundamentally alter the nature" of the game. "The purpose of the walking rule is... not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a cart," wrote Justice Stevens, noting Martin's fatiguing disability.
Source: "PGA TOUR, Inc. v. Martin." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-24. Accessed 9 May. 2024.
